Microsoft's Internet Explorer (IE) technologies are included in its Windows
operating system and software platform at no separate charge. Versions 1 and 2 of IE functioned as add-on features in Windows 95. They were not tightly integrated into Windows and did not make applications programming interfaces available to other software. Over time, IE became increasingly integrated into Windows, sharing code with other Windows features and supplying processing services to other operating system components and to software applications. In addition to distribution as part of Windows, Microsoft has routinely offered free IE distribution and upgrades through other channels.
Microsoft has also compensated Internet Access Providers and Internet Content Providers
for their efforts to promote the use and distribution of IE. Despite IE's ``no-revenue'' track record and assurances of free availability in the future, Microsoft spends large sums developing and promoting IE.
One interpretation of these (and other) facts holds that Microsoft unlawfully ``tied'' the browsing functionality of IE to Windows 95 and 98 for anti-competitive purposes.
1 This view rests on the premise that a non-Microsoft Web browser could evolve into a substitute for Windows or promote potential substitutes. Of course, the emergence of a substitute would erode the profitability of Windows. Hence, according to this view, Microsoft sought to preclude or forestall the emergence of alternative software platforms by tying its own Web browser to Windows and by entering into promotional agreements that raise costs for rival Web browsers.
As an alternative to this view, we offer a pro-competitive perspective on aspects of Microsoft's behavior as well. It also carries important implications for the connection between market structure and consumer welfare.
Zero-Price Distribution of Internet Explorer
Several factors play a role in the design, pricing and distribution of IE, but a key factor is the complementary nature of the demand for Windows and the demand for Web In practice, a negative price may or may not exploit complementary demand more effectively than a zero price. If a negative price can be conditioned on actual use, then the firm earns more profits in the example by paying for the distribution or use of good 2.
Alternatively, if paying for use is infeasible, there is no point in offering the product at a negative price. Instead, by distributing the product at no charge, the firm maximizes product usage (and any effects of complementary demand) without incurring the additional expense of paying customers to take possession. Taking this observation into account and setting 2 0 p = leads to a profit-maximizing price for the first good of
The example captures three salient aspects of the pricing and distribution of Windows and related Microsoft software. First, a computer operating system is highly complementary with applications software and Web use. Second, marginal costs (of production, distribution and customer support) are modest for many types of software, so that below-cost pricing can easily involve a zero-price outcome. Third, the demand for 2 Adobe has pursued this pricing strategy for complementary software products with great success. As Shapiro and Varian (1999, page 254) observe, Adobe allowed its portable document formation (PDF) to "become an open standard but cleverly exploited the complementarities between creating and viewing a document. Adobe charged for the PDF creation software, while giving away the viewing software." Adobe successfully pursued a similar strategy with its Postscript page-description language and related software products.
Windows is greater than the demand for a particular component or for a separate applications product. This observation suggests that Windows plays the role of good 1 in the numerical example, and IE plays the role of good 2.
This analysis provides a simple explanation for the zero-price bundling of IE with Windows and the promotion and free distribution of IE through other channels.
3 There are no dynamic or strategic considerations in this explanation, just basic price theory. 
Market Structure and Consumer Welfare
Complementary demand across product lines gives Microsoft a stronger incentive than rivals to set low prices, even when it has the same development and production costs and the same degree of market power for particular software products. 4 Whether it involves zero-price bundling of software features or lower prices on stand-alone products, This analysis also leads to a simple pro-competitive interpretation of Microsoft's willingness to spend large sums developing Internet Explorer despite the availability of alternative Web browsers. In terms of the model, suppose that two complementary products, OS and WB, are initially developed and marketed by separate firms who 4 The logic underlying this point is closely related to standard arguments about the social benefits of vertical integration when both upstream and downstream firms have market power. See chapter 4 in Tirole (1988) . 5 See Liebowitz and Margolis (1999) , especially pages 154-157, for some systematic evidence.
behave as Cournot or Bertrand actors. In light of the preceding analysis, the two firms have a strong incentive to merge, and a merger would benefit consumers.
Nevertheless, suppose that merger is not an option, either because other aspects of the two businesses do not mesh well, or because of opposition by the antitrust authorities.
Opposition by the antitrust authorities in the presence of important demand complementarities is entirely plausible. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice denied a proposed acquisition of Intuit by Microsoft in 1994. Intuit sells the popular Quicken line of software, which was and is the leading personal finance software for PCs.
Intuit's line of software products is highly complementary to Microsoft's Windows. Still, the DOJ denied the proposed acquisition, because Microsoft Money was the leading competitor to Quicken (Katz and Shapiro, 1999) . Even more to the point, it is hard to imagine that the Department of Justice would have consented to a Microsoft acquisition of Netscape in 1994, when Microsoft had no browser, or in 1995 when Microsoft's Internet Explorer was inferior to Netscape's Navigator.
Short of merger, the two firms might enter into a one-way or reciprocal subsidy arrangement designed to internalize the demand complementarity. An optimally designed arrangement would provide for net-of-subsidy prices that replicate the integrated solution. Indeed, many firms enter into mutual promotion agreements that contain oneway or reciprocal subsidies, but these arrangements can run into serious implementation problems. For example, if the OS firm subsidizes the sale of WB, the WB firm may respond by exaggerating its sales or by expanding into market segments that are not especially helpful to the OS firm. In addition, disagreements regarding demand may hamper an effective subsidy arrangement. Most important, the subsidy solution does not confer common ownership and control, which creates problems if the two firms have imperfectly aligned incentives over how to market or develop their respective products.
Thus, eve n with a subsidy arrangement that optimally internalizes the static demand complementarity, each firm has a continuing incentive to bring the two products under common ownership and control.
Consider the issue in the two-good demand system. Rule out cross-firm subsidies and make four particular assumptions. First, the two goods are initially sold by different firms. Second, it is costly for the OS firm to develop its own version of WB but much more costly for the WB firm to develop its version of OS. Third, the demand structure and marginal production costs are such that the profit-maximizing price of WB is zero or negative in the integrated solution. Fourth, the markets for OS and WB are large enough that entry into the WB market is profitable for the OS firm. 6 These assumptions parallel the market situation circa 1994 as it pertains to Microsoft and its Windows operating system, on one hand, and Netscape and its Navigator Web Browser, on the other.
Given these assumptions, the OS firm finds it profitable to develop its version of WB despite large development costs. After incurring large development costs, the OS firm proceeds to give away its version of WB at no charge. It may even pay others to distribute WB or pay consumers to use it. This course of action obviously harms the original WB firm. Indeed, in our stylized model with perfectly substitutable WB products, the OS firm drives the original WB firm out of the market. But consumer surplus, output and total profits are higher and efficiency is improved relative to the initial two-firm equilibrium.
The ``stylized facts'' in this analysis parallel important elements of Microsoft's behavior with respect to Internet Explorer. Microsoft spent large sums developing IE, then proceeded to bundle it with Windows at no charge and aggressively promote and distribute IE through other channels. Our analysis casts these facts in a pro-consumer, pro-efficiency light. In contrast, the government interprets Microsoft's decision to spend large sums to develop and promote a ``zero-revenue'' product as clearly ``anticompetitive'' and ``predatory'' actions.
The complementary demand perspective explains Microsoft's large and broad presence in software markets as a natural consequence of its ownership of Windows, the product with the largest development costs. It also explains why Microsoft is the leading supplier of software development tools, and why it intensively cultivates the development of software applications by other firms, even its competitors. Note that Microsoft's incentive to stimulate applications persists even if there is no entry threat in the market for software platforms. Hence, the motive identified here is distinct from any desire to fortify an ``applications barrier to entry."
If the complementary demand interpretation of Microsoft's product development and pricing behavior is correct, or even an important part of the full story, then
Microsoft's broad presence in software markets has highly beneficial effects for consumers and economic efficiency. By the same logic, breaking Microsoft apart so as to separate the software applications division from operating systems and software platforms, as some have suggested, would raise prices, lower output and reduce consumer welfare. On top of these static losses, by undermining Microsoft's ability to internalize demand complementarities, a break up would lessen its incentive to develop new and improved software applications through its own efforts or by subsidizing the efforts of other firms.
Direct Benefits of Integration
The foregoing analysis does not explain why Microsoft integrated IE more tightly into Windows over time. We offer brief remarks here and treat the general topic of software integration at greater length in Davis et al. (2001 Suite--which includes Word, Excel and PowerPoint--was first marketed as a bundle of compatible software products. Over time, the underlying software code became increasingly integrated, partly to facilitate a more uniform feature set and user interface.
Code sharing also reduces software development costs and makes it more worthwhile to optimize the design of particular software components. These two similarities point to pro-competitive motivations for the integration of IE into Windows.
Mathematical Supplement
This supplement considers the two-good linear demand system specified in the main text. We derive equilibrium price and quantity solutions for the integrated case where a single firm sells both goods and for the Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium outcomes. We also prove that consumers are better off and profits are greater in the integrated case than in the Bertrand and Cournot outcomes under conditions spelled out below.
The inverse demand system is
We derive equilibrium price and quantity outcomes in the two-good model under three alternative assumptions about market structure. In one market structure, a single, integrated firm sells both goods. In the other two market structures, the two goods are sold by different firms. We consider two versions of the two-firm market structure, which differ in terms of whether firms use prices or quantities as their strategic choice variable.
We also prove that consumers are better off, total profits are higher, and economic efficiency is greater in the single-firm equilibrium than either equilibrium with two firms.
We begin with a formal statement of this theoretical result.
Proposition: Consider the two-good linear demand system with the following parameter restrictions:
(positive demand at zero price)
• b i > 0, i = 1, 2 (downward sloping demand)
(complementary demand and own-price effects dominate)
(willingness to pay exceeds cost of production for some consumers)
Consumers are better off and profits are greater when a single, integrated firm sells both goods than when separate firms (behaving in either a Bertrand or Cournot manner) sell the two goods.
________________ Proof:
When a single firm sells both goods, profit maximization implies
Solving these two conditions simultaneously yields the profit-maximizing output levels in the single-firm case: Thus far, we have shown that prices are lower and outputs are higher for both goods under the integrated, single-firm case than in the two-firm case with Cournot competition.
Lower prices and higher output mean that consumers are better off in the integrated, single-firm case. Total profits are also higher in the integrated case, because an integrated firm can always earn at least as much profits as the two competing firms. Since both profits and consumer welfare are higher in the integrated case, it is also more efficient.
In the two-firm case under Bertrand competition (prices as strategies), profit maximization implies the reaction curves. 
One can show by example that, depending on parameter values, one of the Bertrand equilibrium prices may be higher than its counterpart under the single-firm solution.
Thus, a simple comparison of Bertrand and single-firm outcomes does not tell us which market structure is better for consumers. To answer that question, we compare consumer surplus under the two market structures.
The two-good linear demand system derives from quadratic preferences of the 
Our objective now is to compare the consumer surplus under the Bertrand and single-firm outcomes. The following two identities that relate the parameters of the direct and inverse demand systems will be useful:
Using the identity (xi), rewrite the Bertrand reaction equation for good 1 as 
Manipulating these two equations, we obtain
Now plug (xiii) and (xiv) into the expression for consumer surplus to obtain But the right side of this inequality is simply 2CS S . Therefore, consumer surplus is greater in the integrated case than under Bertrand competition. As before, profits are also higher in the integrated case. Since consumer surplus and profits are higher, the integrated outcome is more efficient.
That completes the proof of the proposition. The assumption that willingness to pay exceeds the cost of production for some consumers is essential to the proof that consumer surplus in the integrated case exceeds consumer surplus in the Bertrand case. For example, if 121212 100, 50, =b=1, 0.5, 10, aabdcc ===== then direct calculations
show that (a) the willingness-to-pay assumption fails for good 2, (b) all other assumptions of the proposition hold, (c) there exists a Bertrand equilibrium in which both firms make positive profits, (d) the integrated firm sells both goods at positive prices, and (e) consumer surplus is higher in the Bertrand equilibrium than the integrated outcome. 
